T he article in PNAS by Casey et al. (1) reports previously undescribed data from individuals who participated as preschoolers in Mischel's now-classic delay of gratification studies conducted at Stanford University's Bing Nursery School in the early 1970s. Now in their mid-40s, these individuals performed a Go-No-go task, in which they were instructed to press a key when a certain stimulus (e.g., fearful face) was presented but to refrain from responding when another stimulus (e.g., happy face) was presented. Individuals who as children had resisted eating an enticing treat, such as a marshmallow, and instead waited up to 15 min for a larger reward (and who continued to present greater self-control across childhood and into adolescence)-dubbed high delayers-performed better than those who failed to wait (i.e., low delayers) but only when required to refrain from responding to happy faces. This finding is important because it adds to a growing body of evidence that individual differences in cognitive control (also called "executive function") measured in early childhood are associated with important developmental outcomes. For example, results from another ongoing longitudinal study found that cognitive control reported between the ages of 3 and 11 y predicted (as a gradient) physical health, substance dependence, socioeconomic status, and the likelihood of a criminal conviction at the age of 32 y, even after controlling for social class of origin and intelligence quotient (2) . The Bing study is especially compelling in that cognitive control has been measured in direct assessments over time in addition to verbal reports.
Values Vs. Control
Findings like these suggest remarkable trait-like stability, but exactly what is stable, and for whom, remains unclear. Casey et al. (1) suggest that what is stable is a biologically based ability to resist temptation-an ability subserved by the right inferior frontal gyrus-and that only the temptations themselves change with age: Candy is to the child as social affiliation is to the adult. This suggestion rests on the assumption that children who fail to wait for the larger reward are unable to do so. In fact, however, there is no "right" way to behave in the delay-of-gratification situation; sometimes, a bird in the hand really is worth two in the bush, and delaying gratification in this task may reflect children's values rather than their abilities.
In other words, low delayers may be able but not always willing to forego a smaller reward for a larger one, which Mischel and Shoda (3) have pointed out in earlier writings on the Cognitive-Affective-Personality-System model. Children's values may vary not only according to situations
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but as a function of temperament, upbringing, learning history, socioeconomic status, and many other potential differences between high and low delayers. This is important because if delaying is interpreted as self-control ability, it may be tempting to imagine that one's fate is sealed at a tender age. Regardless of the extent to which delaying reflects ability or values, however, research in developmental neuroscience suggests that it is likely to be malleable (4).
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences
Casey et al.
(1) address another important distinction relevant to cognitive controlthat between cool and cognitive (i.e., top-down) and hot and emotional (i.e., bottom-up) influences on behavior. Low delayers, who made more erroneous responses to No-go stimuli in the happy faces conditions, showed greater activation in a region associated with the processing of rewarding stimuli (i.e., ventral striatum). They also showed less differentiation between Go and No-go trials in their activations of a region implicated in cognitive control (right inferior frontal gyrus). The inverse correlation between activation in regions associated with top-down control and those associated with bottom-up influences is important, although it may reflect the nature of the task more than nature itself. In this paradigm, one is necessarily either exhibiting top-down control or attending to alluring stimuli (happy faces). There are other situations in which bottom-up influences could well work in concert with top-down processing-as captured, for example, by the somatic marker hypothesis and the iterative reprocessing model (5, 6) . It is therefore difficult to disentangle top-down and bottom-up influences on behavior in the context of this paradigm, and individual differences in performance could be attributed to differences in cognitive control, differences in sensitivity to rewarding stimuli, or both.
In the current study, cognitive control was assessed in the absence of salient stimuli (cool version) and no differences were observed. Although this could perhaps be interpreted as evidence that the two groups did not differ in cognitive control (only in reward sensitivity), it is also common to find that group differences in cognitive control only emerge when under challenging conditions (4) . Introduction of salient stimuli (in this case, positive, "approach" stimuli from which participants are required to withdraw), surely makes the task more difficult. The high delayers maintained high levels of performance even on the more difficult hot version, whereas the low delayers did not; their performance suffered when taxed. It remains important to tease apart top-down and bottom-up influences in future research, for example, by assessing differences in reward sensitivity in the absence of cognitive control requirements.
Delay and Destiny
The research by Casey et al. (1) illustrates continuing stable differences in performance between individuals who were identified early in life as high or low delayers. It is now clear, however, that performance always reflects a combination of skill and motivation, ability and values, and top-down and bottom-up influences. The challenge is to disentangle their relative influences and to understand how they interact. Far from implying psychological and social determinism, these findings serve to underscore further the importance of promoting the healthy development of cognitive control, because individual differences in performance on measures of cognitive control, whatever their nature and whatever their origins, may persist for decades to come.
